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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 16827 
LAWRENCE J. SORENSON, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant-Appellant, Lawrence J. Sorenson, (here-
inafter Defendant) appeals from a verdict and judgment of guilty 
on four counts of Theft and/or Theft by Deception in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 6, § 404 and/or 405, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Defendant was charged and tried by a jury on six 
counts of Theft and/or Theft by Deception. The Defendant was 
found guilty of Counts I through IV and a judgment was entered 
thereon. Verdicts of not guilty were returned on Counts V and VI. 
Defendant appeals - from the verdicts and judgments entered on 
Counts I through IV. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgments on Counts I 
through IV and judgments in his favor as a matter of law, or that 
failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PREFACE 
The Complaint against the Defendant charged theft in 
that he "did obtain by deception or exercise unauthorized control 
over the property of another." Difficulty arises in attempting 
to restate the facts consistent with the alternative charges 
contained in the Complaint. Additionally, due to the numerous 
representations made by the Defendant and ·the general verdict 
returned it is impossible to determine, assuming theft by decep-
tion, which representations the jury deemed made and untrue. 
Inasmuch as the arguments presented herein are predicated upon 
questions of law and not the sufficiency of the evidence, no 
attempt has been made to restate the facts consistent with all 
possible determinations of the jury. The verdicts of guilty on 
Counts I through IV are consistent with a finding by the jury 
that either the Defendant obtained funds from the Complainants by 
making one or more misrepresentations, or, having obtained the 
funds lawfully, did exercise unauthorized control over the money, 
or both. 
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BACKGROUND 
The facts relating to Counts I through IV show that the 
Defendant formed Western Heritage, Inc. (hereinafter referred to 
as "W.H.I.") in late 1977. The Defendant served as Chairman of 
the Board of W.H.I. and acted as its manager-director. (Tr. at 
page 290) The stated purpose of W.H.I. was to assist its clients 
in establishing retail franchise operations. (Tr. at page 290) 
On the 4th day of April, 1978, David Candland (herein-
after referred to as "Candland") and Lester Thatcher (hereinafter 
referred to as "Thatcher") from Portland, Oregon, contacted 
W.H.I. seeking property, financing, and professional assistance 
for a restaurant they wished to establish in Utah. The restaur-
ant was to be named Apple Dumplin' and was to be a joint venture 
between Candland and Thatcher. Candland and/or Thatcher testi-
fied that during their first meetings with D~fendant, he repre-
sented to them, among other things, that: 1) W.H.I. could sell 
them a piece of property for their restaurant at 941 South State, 
Salt Lake City, Utah; 2) W.H.I could procure for them one hun-
dred percent (100%) leaseback financing; 3) W.H.I. was a large, 
successful, real estate development firm with offices around the 
United States; 4) W .H. I. had been involved in numerous other 
successful projects similar to theirs; 5) W.H.I. had a commitment 
for $10, 000, 000. 00 from an outside financing source; and 6) 
W.H.I. was run and staffed by members of the L.D.S. church. (Tr. 
at pages 97, 98, 99, 195, 199, 200) Candland and Thatcher, 
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relying on one or more of the representations of Defendant, 
decided to proceed with the Defendant and W.H.I. in their attempt 
to establl.sh the Apple Dumplin' . 
COUNT I 
On April 28, 1978, the Defendant requested and obtained 
$5,000.00 from Candland. (State's Exhibit "7") On the same 
date, Candland and Thatcher entered into an Earnest Money Agree-
ment with W.H.I. on a piece of property located on State Street, 
Salt Lake City. (State's Exhibit "5") Candland testified that 
payment was induced by the foregoing representations and the 
additional representations made by the Defendant that: 1) the 
money was needed to satisfy the requirements for financing 
(State's Exhibit "13" Item 3) and was not to be applied to the 
deposit required under the Earnest Money Agreement; 2) the money 
was a refundable deposit; 3) funding was available subject to :id 
their qualifying; 4) upon financing being approved all "up front" 
monies would be returned; and 5) the money was to be held in a 
special trust or real estate escrow account. (Tr. at pages 99 to 
101) The $5, 000. 00 received from Candland was placed in the 
business account of W .H. I. and spent in the regular course of 
business. (State's Exhibit "17") 
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COUNT II 
On the 3rd day of May, 1978, Thatcher paid to W.H.I. an 
additional $5,000.00. (State's Exhibit "8") Thatcher testified 
that he relied on the same representations cited above in making 
the payment. The payment was deposited in the business account 
of W.H.I. and was spent in the regular course of business. 
COUNT III 
On the 17th day of June, 1978, Thatcher paid to W.H.I. 
an additional $10,000.00. (State's Exhibit "9") Thatcher testi-
fied that this payment was induced by the representations of the 
Defendant that: 1) Candland and Thatcher's financial statement 
was insufficient to obtain the financing (Tr. at page 189); 2) he 
(Defendant) had substantial capital and was willing to invest 
with them and become their partner; 3) that the first and last 
months lease payment of $20,000.00 had to be immediately paid in 
order for the financing to be approved; 4) he (Defendant) would 
invest $10 ,000. 00 if Candland and Thatcher could come up with 
another $10, 000. 00; 5) financing had been approved; and 6) the 
money ($10,000.00) would be returned once the funding was 
actually obtained. (Tr. at pages 191 to 193) The money paid by 
Thatcher was deposited in the business account of W.H.I. and 
spent in the regular course of business. 
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COUNT IV 
Thatcher paid an additional $ 22, 000. 00 to W. H. I. by 
means of two checks (State's Exhibits "6" and "10") in August of 
1978. Thatcher testified that both of these payments were in-
duced by the representations of Defendant that: 1) previous 
funding had fallen through; 2) a new source of funding had been 
found but that additional up front money was needed to complete 
the transaction due to the difference in interest rates the bank 
was willing to pay a trust fund to deposit a compensating sum in 
their bank, and what the trust fund had demanded; 3) Defendant 
was going to put up $50, 000. 00 of his own money to obtain the 
funds; 4) the money would only be needed for a couple of days. 
(Tr. at page 193) Of the $22,000.00 paid by Thatcher, $14,000.00 
was paid out in an attempt to get financing. A portion of 
$14, 000. 00 was returned, and together with the remaining 
$8,000.00, it was placed in the business account of W.H.I. and 
spent in the regular course of business. 
For the sole purpose of clarifying the transcript on 
file herein and the legal arguments that follow, the defendant's :ijr1 
testimony contradicted the foregoing in almost every instance. ::~! 
Defendant testified that all of the payments were received as 
payments on the State Street property pursuant to the Earnest 
Money Agreement between himself and Candland and Thatcher. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY 
RULED SECTION 77-31-17*, ENTIT-
LED "FALSE PRETENSES EVI-
DENCE OF 11 , INAPPLICABLE TO 
PROSECUTIONS ALLEGING THEFT 
AND/OR THEFT BY DECEPTION 
With the enactment of the new Utah Criminal Code1 in 
1973 the legislature abolished the offense of "false pretense" 
and other similar crimes and incorporated those offenses into a 
single offense designated "theft". Section 76-6-403 provides: 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a 
single offense embracing the separate offenses such as 
those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, 
larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, 
extortion, blackmail, receiving stolen property. An 
accusation of theft may be supported by evidence that 
it was committed in any manner specified in Sections 
76-6-404 through 76-6-410, subject to the power of the 
court to ensure a fair trial by granting a continuance 
or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the 
defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or 
by surprise. (emphasis added) 
At the time the new Utah Criminal Code was enacted, the legisla-
ture left unamended § 77-31-17 of the Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which provides: 
* 
1. 
Upon a trial for having obtained, with an intent to 
cheat or defraud another designedly by any false 
pretense, the signature of any person to a written 
instrument, or from any person any money, personal 
Al I statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-1-101 to 76-10-1401, 1953 as amended 
Page 7 
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property or valuable thing, the defendant shall not be 
convicted, if the false pretense was expressed in 
language, unaccompanied by a false token or writing, 
unless the pretense or some note or memorandum thereof 
is in writing, subscribed by or in the handwriting of 
the defendant, or unless the pretense is proved by the 
testimony of two witnesses, or that of one witness and 
corroborating circumstances; but this section shall 
not apply to a prosecution for falsely representing or 
persona ting another, and in such assumed character 
marrying, or receiving any money or property. 
The legal questions raised at trial and presented 
herein are 1) whether § 77-31-17 has continued applicability to 
prosecutions alleging "theft" by deception, and if so; 2) whether 
the Court erred by refusing to instruct the jury thereon in the 
2 
case at bar. 
A comparison between the prior offense of "false pre-
tense" and the new inclusive crime of "theft" by deception re-
veals that the two crimes proscribe the same type of conduct and 
and that the new offense of "theft" by deception envelopes the 
2. See 11 Utah New Criminal Code 11 , 73 Utah Law Review 718 at p. 750,footnote 
210, wherein that author notes: 
A provision of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure that the 
Legislature left unamended requires, for conviction of false pre-
tenses, the testimony of two witnesses or the existence of a 
writing signed by or in the handwriting of the defendant or the 
testimony of one witness and corroborating circumstances. Id. § 
77-31-17 (1953). To the extent that this provision may be inter 
preted to apply to the new deception offense, it should be re 
pealed to avoid an adverse procedural effect upon consolidation. 
See Perkins, supra note 3, at 320 (emphasis added) 
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same or similar elements of the prior offense of "false pre-
tense". 
3 Under prior law, the State established the offense of 
"false pretense" by showing that 1) the defendant made false 
representations; 2) knowing them to be false; 3) with intent to 
defraud; 4) received something of value from a victim; and 5) who 
relied upon the representations. Ballaine v District Court, 107 
Utah 247, 255, 153 P.2d 265, 267 (1944). 4 Section 76-6-405, the 
provision with which defendant herein was charged, requires a 
showing by the State that 1) the defendant did obtain control 
over the property of another; 2) by deception; 3) with the pur-
pose to deprive him thereof; and that 4) the value of the pro-
perty exceeded $1,000.00. Section 76-6-401(5) defines that 
"deception" occurs under the new Code as follows: 
"Deception" when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impres-
sion of law or fact that is false and that the actor 
does not believe to be true and that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact 
that the actor previously created or confirmed by 
words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another and that the actor does not now believe to 
be true; or 
3. See "Utah New Criminal Code", 73 Utah Law Review 718 
4. See also, State v. Vatsis, 10 Utah 2d 244, 351 P.2d 96 (1960); 
State v. Timmerman, 88 Utah 481, 55 P.2d 1320 (1936); 
State v. Howd, 55 Utah 527, 188 P .628 (1920). 
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(c) Prevents another from acquring information likely 
to affect his judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers pro-
perty without disclosing a lien, security interest, 
adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoy-
ment of the property, whether the lien, security 
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or 
is or is not a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another in the transaction, which per-
formance the actor does not intend to perform or knows 
will not be performed; provided, however, that failure 
to perform the promise in issue without other evidence 
of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that 
the actor did not intend to perform or knew the pro-
mises would not be performed. 
The similarity between the prior offense of "false 
pretense" and the new offense "theft by deception", together with 
:ti 
iill 
the express legislative statement that the prior offense is 
embodied under the offense of "theft" by deception, leaves no :r~\' 
doubt that the legislature did not eliminate the offense of ··· 
"false pretense" but merely consolidated and recodified it under '.t~ 
another title. There appears no valid reason why the concerns and ::c 
intent expressed by the legislatures enactment of § 77-31-17 ~!ID 
should not have continuing force and effect under the new Crim-
inal Code. 
In addition to. the foregoing, under well-established ·.t 
rules of statutory construction, § 77-31-17 should be given con-
tinuing application. This Court has long held that, where pos-
sible and consistent with other enactments, statutes should be 
construed so as to give meaning and effect thereto. Totorica , 
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v. Thomas 16 Utah 2d 1975, 397 P.2d 984 (1965) And 1 rus v. A lred, 
17 Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d 972 (1965) The legislature itself has 
directed that statutes should be liberally construed so as to 
give them effect. Section 68-3-2 provides, in relevant part: 
The statutes establish the laws of this state res-
pecting the subjects to which they relate, and their 
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects 
of the statutes and to promote justice. (emphasis 
added) 
In spite of the foregoing, the trial court held Section 
77-31-17 inapplicable to "theft by deception" prosecutions which 
leaves the section without any force of effect whatsoever. While 
it is not reflected in the record, the trial court relied in part 
on the title of the section in question in making its decision, 
the title being "False Pretense - Evidence of". This Court has 
previously ruled that the titles to statutes are not part of the 
statutes. Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Packing Co., 18 
Utah 20 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966) Reliance alone on the title of 
the statute is improper where the language of the statute is 
unambiguous and the statute in question has apparent application. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Section 77-31-17 has 
application to prosecutions for "theft by deception," its speci-
fic application to the case at bar requires further analysis. 
One of the charges consolidated within each count of 
the State's case against the defendant herein is that he obtained 
the property of Thatcher and Candland by means of deception· 
Obviously,· at this stage of the proceeding, there is no way to 
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determine which allegations or representations made by the defen-
dant the jury found untrue and whether that representation was 
sufficiently corroborated in compliance with Section 77-31-17. 
Neither is it possible to determine upon which charge the jury 
based their verdict. There can be no doubt, however, that the 
determination of sufficient corroboration is a factual determin-
ation to be made by the jury and that it is procedural error to 
refuse to instruct the jury therein. State v. Clawson, 6 Utah 2d 
160, 308 P.2d 264; State v. Foust, 588 P.2d 170 (1978). 
Defendant submits that the trial Court committed pre-
:ri 
judicial error in refusing to instruct the jury on provisions :::ru 
contained in Section 77-31-17, after having been requested to do I~ 
so by counsel, and that as a matter of law the Defendant is 
entitled to a reversal, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY 
EXCLUDED AS HEARSAY DEFEN-
DANT'S PROFERRED EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING THE BASIS FOR THE 
REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO COM-
PLAINANTS 
Complainants (Thatcher and Candland) testified through-
out the State's presentation of its case that the primary repre-
sentation made by the Defendant which induced them to deal with 
W. H. I. , and which eventually induced them to pay to W. H. I. a 
total of $42, 000. 00, was that there was available to them, 
through W .H. I., 100% leaseback financing for their restaurant. 
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(Tr. at pages 96, 97, 186, J98, 203 and 205) The charge of 
"theft by deception" necessarily required the jury to determine 
whether the Defendant made that representation knowing it to be 
false. 5 
As illustrated by the verbatim excerpts from the trans-
cript set forth below, numerous attempts were made to elicit 
testimony evidencing that other third parties had made represen-
tations concerning financing to the Defendant and that it was 
based on these third party conversations that Defendant in turn 
made representations to the Complainants. The specific inter-
changes between the Court and counsel with respect to the at-
tempts to elicit that testimony are as follows: 
Transcript of testimony of Valoy 0. Adams at Tr. page 
240, lines 13 to 19. 
Q Did they ever make a commitment to you 
or Western Heritage Inc. concerning that financing? 
A The commitment was all verbal from 
Anthony and Associates. They said yes, they would--
MR. JONES: Object to any statements 
made on the other end. Clearly hearsay. 
THE COURT: It is hearsay. Sustained. 
Transcript of testimony of Valoy 0. Adams at Tr. page 
241, lines 1 to 12 
THE WITNESS: All right, sir. At 
their own expense they flew to Utah to look over some 
of the packages and some of the concepts that Western 
Heritage was developing. And at their expense they 
5. Section 76-6-401 (S)(a) 
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brought in a Mr. King, who, in Mr. Sorensen's office 
and in the_presence of many of these people with whom 
- we were attempting to finance did commit--
MR. JONES: Objection, hearsay, your 
Honor. 
MR. McDOUGAL: Your Honor, we're not 
submitting the statements for the truth of the matter 
contained therein; simply for the fact the state-
ment was made. (emphasis added) 
THE COURT: The objection's sustained. 
Q (By Mr. McDougal) Do you want to go 
to the next? Anything else that they did rather than 
what they said. Did they supply you with any mate-
rials? 
A Well, what--! can't tell you what they 
did. Did not--
MR. JONES: The question was what they 
did, your Honor and he's not responding. 
Transcript of testimony of Lawrence J. Sorensen (Defen-
dant) at Tr. page 302, lines 13 to 22 
Q Mr. Sorensen, I want to take you back 
to 1977. Could you tell us what efforts were made on 
behalf of Mr. Candland and Mr. Thatcher to obtain the 
financing that you said was available? 
A Yes, originally we submitted when their 
financial statement came in, we submitted the terms 
that they had sent us to Mr. King. Mr. King informed 
us--
MR. JONES: Objection to the statement 
by Mr. King, your Honor. Hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Transcript of testimony of Lawrence J. Sorensen (Defen-
dant) at Tr. page 303, lines 7 to 27. 
Q Some time down the road, did you meet 
with Mr. King concerning the financing? 
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Mr. King. 
A Yes. We did. 
Q And what happened at that meeting? 
A He stated that he would---
Q Mr. Sorensen--
MR. JONES: Your Honor--
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. JONES: Object to any comments by 
I think the witness is aware of that too. 
THE COURT: Ask your question. 
Q (By Mr. McDougal) Tell us what hap-
pened. What was given to Mr. King and what did he 
give back to you? 
A The applications were 
had been submitted previously to him. 
their financial--
MR. JONES: Objection. 
submitted that 
He stated that 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
THE COURT: You' re trying to tell us 
what somebody else told you, sir. That's something 
that can't be done. 
As the above excerpts reflect, the Court excluded all 
testimony concerning statements made to the Defendant and others 
by third parties. The Court ruled, in spite of counsel's argu-
ment that the statements were not being offered to prove the 
truth of the matters asserted therein, that the statements were 
hearsay and therefore inadmissable. 
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Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay as: 
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a 
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to 
prove the matter asserted ... (emphasis added) 
There is no doubt that the solicited testimony would be 
hearsay if it had been offered to prove the matter therein con-
tained, re: that there was actually money available to W .H. I. 
and the Complainants. The issue therefore turns on whether the 
evidence was offered for the truth of the matters asserted. ~ 
In the general discussion of what constitutes hearsay :~1 
evidence contained in 29 Am. Jur. 2d at § 496, the author states: 
In the event a statement is introduced for the purpose 
of establishing that a party relied and acted upon it, 
such a statement is not objectionable on the ground 
that it is hearsay. (emphasis added) 
The Tenth Circuit applied the above general rule in a 
case directly on point to the case at bar in Frank v. U.S., (10th 
Cir. 1955) 220 F.2d 559, 563-64, wherein the defendant was con-
victed of mail fraud in connection with the solicitations of :ti! 
investments by means of false and fraudulent representations i:i: 
concerning a "magnetic logger", an alleged oil finding device· 
The court held it reversible error to preclude the defendant from 
testifying concerning testimonials he had received praising the 
accuracy of the device. The court explained: 
An offer was made to prove by Frank ... that he made 60 
tests of the device and he was subsequently told by 
parties familiar with the results obtained in the 
drilling of such wells that his predictions were 
accurate in every instance. This evidence was offered 
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upon the theory that it tended to show that Frank was 
in _go~d. faith in making representations respecting 
rel1ab1l1 ty of the device. The trial court rejected 
the proffered testimony as hearsay. 
The statements said to have been made to Frank by 
third parties were not offered to prove that such 
statements were true but as tending to show that Frank 
was led thereby to believe that the magnetic logger 
could be relied upon. Evidence of this character is 
not objectionable as hearsay. (emphasis added) 
In a similar case, involving fraud, Robert A. Pierce 
Co. v. Sherman Gardens Company, (1966 Nevada), 419 P.2d 781, 784, 
the court expressed the rule as follows: 
Wherein intent to defraud is an issue, conversations 
with third persons, or statements made by them, tend-
ing to negate an intent to defraud on the part of thg 
party whose motive is material, are admissable. 
There can be no doubt that intent was an issue in the 
case before this Court, specifically the questions of whether 
Defendant knew the representations he made to be false. Indeed, 
any prosecution under the theft by deception provisions of the 
Utah Criminal Code raises the issue. The trial court, by re-
fusing to admit conversations with third parties tending to 
negate the requisite intent, effectively precluded the Defendant 
from presenting to the jury evidence tending to show that he was 
led to believe that the representations concerning financing 
could be relied upon. As pointed out to the Court (Tr. at page 
6. See, in accord, People v. Marsh, (1962) 58 C.2d 732, 26 CA. R. 300, 
376, P.2d 300, 303-305. 
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241) the statements were not offered to prove that such state-
ments were true but as evidence that such statements were made to 
the Defendant and believed by him. 
The wrongful exclusion of the statements due to the mis 
application of the hearsay rule was highly prejudicial in that, 
as the record reflects, the State relied heavily upon proving 
that the Defendant knowingly misrepresented to Complainants the 
availability and terms for 100% leaseback financing. Defendant 
sincerely submits to this Court, based on this error alone, that 
he is entitled to a new trial so that the finder of fact can be 
presented all of the relevant evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court committed, over the proper objections 
of the Defendant, two prejudicial errors which deprived the 
Defendant from having the finders of fact evaluate the evidence 
by the applicable legal requirements and from having them con-
sider all admissable evidence. 
The trial Court's holding that Section 77-31-17 is 
inapplicable to prosecutions for theft by deception is improper 
in that it ignores both statutory and judicial rules which re-
quire its application. 
Secondly, the Court improperly excluded as hearsay 
critical evidence relevant to the Defendant's state of mind. 
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Either or both of the errors committed by the trial 
Court require a reversal of the convictions and that this matter 
be remanded for a new trial. Only a new trial can afford the 
Defendant the opportunity to have a finder of fact consider all 
of the evidence and to have that evidence measured by the proper 
statutory standards necessary for a conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Defendant/appellant's counsel respectfuly requests an 
opportunity to orally argue the merits of the matters contained 
herein. 
DATED this 18th day of March, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McDOUGAL, HALEY & DAHL 
250 East Broadway, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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